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Abstract
We analyze cascades of defaults in an interbank loan market. The novel feature of this study is that the net-
work structure and the size distribution of banks are derived from empirical data. We find that the ability of a
defaulted institution to start a cascade depends on an interplay of shock size and connectivity. Further results
indicate that the ability to limit default risk by spreading the lending to many counterparts decreased with
the financial crisis. To evaluate the influence of the network structure on market stability, we compare the
simulated cascades from the empirical network with results from different randomized network models. The
results show that the empirical network has non-random features, which cannot be captured by rewired net-
works. The analysis also reveals that simulations assuming homogeneity for size of banks and loan contracts
dramatically overestimates the fragility of the interbank market.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the likelihood of
cascades of defaults in an interbank loan mar-
ket. The novel feature of this investigation
is that we use empirical data to calibrate our
model and compare the results with different
null models. This also allows us to make a
statement about the accuracy of the existing lit-
erature on cascades in financial markets. We
find that stylized random network models are
very likely to overestimate cascade effects after
a shock to the system.
Overnight loans are a financial instrument to
redistribute liquidity between banks in the short
term. These loans are settled in two different
ways. Most of them are settled as over-the-
counter (OTC) agreements, about which data is
not systematically collected. Studies on inter-
bank loan markets therefor often rely on data
that is reconstructed from the observation of
payments between banks (see, e.g., Arciero et
al., 2013). The data that we analyze here is not
from OTC transactions. It comes from the Ital-
ian trading platform E-mid. In principle ev-
ery bank could join this platform, and in fact
roughly one third of the users are foreign banks.
Banks can trade loans with different maturities
and different currencies. In our study we fo-
cus on the euro-denominated (unsecured) over-
night loans, which constitute by far the largest
share of all transactions. Earlier studies have
shown that the Italian market can be regarded
as representative for the Euro money market,
as the relative order flow to this market was
relatively stable (see, e.g., Beaupain and Durré,
2011).
There is an increase of research on linkages
between banks since the 2008 financial crisis.
Some European markets have been analyzed
for example by Furfine (2003), Hartmann et al.
(2001), and Cocco et al. (2009). The U.S. money
market system, Fed-wire, has been analyzed for
example by Ashcraft and Duffie (2007) and So-
ramäki et al. (2007). The interest in these mar-
kets has risen for two reasons: the partial col-
lapse of the interbank markets itself and the in-
creasing need for risk assessment in the bank
network in general. The contagious effects that
played a big role in the events after the Lehman
default showed that a micro-prudential analy-
sis of banks’ exposures to counterparts does not
capture the systemic risks that the default of
a bank can pose (see, e.g., Haldane and May,
2011; Lux, 2011).
Some earlier studies on the E-mid market ex-
ist (see, e.g., Iori et al., 2008). From the analysis
of conditional trading volume (Fricke and Lux,
2013) we know that no pronounced clusters of
banks exist in the Italian market. The develop-
ment of spreads and lending relationships have
been analyzed by Raddant (2014), who found
that banks try hard to avoid large exposures
since 2008. The network structure of the mar-
ket (see also Fricke and Lux, 2014) can at best be
described as a core-periphery structure, similar
to the findings by Craig and von Peter (2010)
for the German market. In parallel to our study,
default cascades in the E-mid market have also
been analyzed by Roukny et al. (2013), although
their focus is on the search for an optimal net-
work structure. We can however confirm one of
their findings, which is that network structure
matters mainly in fragile markets.
Several studies have tried to analyze systemic
risk in interbank loan networks, for example
by simulating knock-on effects in the case of
a default. From relatively simple models like
Nier et al. (2007), who study cascade effects in
a Bernoulli random graph, research has evolved
to more fine-tuned models like in Arinaminpa-
thy et al. (2012), where more realistic network
structures and liquidity effects are taken into ac-
count. Mechanisms of loss amplification have
been discussed by Battiston et al. (2012b) and
Shin (2008). Boss et al. (2006) show for Aus-
tria that the network structure between banks
is somewhat close to a scale-free graph, and
that loan and bank size distributions can be ap-
proximated by a power law. Muller (2006) ana-
lyzes cascades in the system of interbank loans
for Switzerland, Santos and Cont (2010) analyze
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the Brazilian market, using a more detailed data
set. Mistrulli (2011) shows how missing data on
links can be approximated efficiently. The pa-
per by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) is more on the
theoretical side, the authors discuss cyclical in-
terdependence and stability in a system of mu-
tual repayments. A recent paper by Glasserman
and Young (2014) builds on the latter and ana-
lyzes how likely differently distributed shocks
can lead to contagion. Our paper is method-
ologically close to the one by Nier et al. (2007),
but uses empirical data on the loan network.
The findings of Glasserman and Young (2014)
and also the findings in the aforementioned em-
pirical studies hint at limitations of simulation
studies that use homogeneously sized banks or
degree. Specifically, it is not possible to charac-
terize systemically important nodes or to create
realistic chains of defaults if homogeneity is as-
sumed.
Cascade models certainly do not reflect all as-
pects of real financial markets. For the case of
financial institutions, one problem is that we do
not have (and probably never will have) data
on the activity of banks for all financial prod-
ucts through which networks between them ex-
ist. The second problem is that we cannot know
how the interbank market would continue on
the days and weeks after a default, since in this
kind of cascade simulations the start of the cas-
cade is defined by the (hypothetical) removal
of one node (bank) from the network. In this
respect, the analysis of default cascades dif-
fers from studies on disease spreading or cas-
cades in social networks (see, e.g., Holme and
Saramäki , 2012; Karimi and Holme, 2013) in
which cascades with a temporal structure are
analyzed.
In this study we do not aim at a complete
model of financial contagion. For this, more
complex models with different layers of connec-
tions and a dynamic structure would be needed
(see Kok and Montagna, 2013). However, in or-
der to build these multiplex models, certain lay-
ers have to be approximated and rules for the
behavior of participants have to be calibrated.
The results that we obtain from the analysis of
one known layer, the overnight market, are an
important input for this modeling, as our results
can serve as a benchmark for calibration and
help to asses the margin of error which differ-
ent specifications of network models can have.
For this reason, we set up an interbank net-
work that is derived from empirical data on the
Italian interbank loan market (E-mid). Specifi-
cally, we use daily snapshots of loan contracts in
this market and derive a network of netted daily
exposures. We randomly choose a bank to de-
fault and analyze knock-on effects to other mar-
ket participants, based on the network given by
interbank loans. We generate simplified balance
sheets for each bank to determine its solvency.
The balance sheet items that are not given by the
data on interbank lending are hypothetical, but
they are generated to be consistent with their in-
terbank behavior, i.e., we obtain a network with
a reasonable distribution of bank size, where all
banks have the same a-priori ability (relative to
their size) to absorb a shock. Finally we com-
pare the results with those from different net-
work models (null models), in which distribu-
tional properties of the network are simplified.
This allows us to judge which kind of networks
models should be used in cases where empirical
data is not available.
The remainder of the paper goes like this: In
Section 2 we explain the data set, how we de-
rive the bank’s balance sheets, and how we sim-
ulate cascade effects. In Section 3 we discuss the
simulation results. In Section 4 we compare the
simulation results with those of different null
models from random network. Section 5 con-
cludes the paper.
2 Material and methods
2.1 Loan data and bank balance
sheets
For our investigation we use tick data from the
interbank loan trading platform E-mid. In this
data set the names of the banks have been re-
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<nodes> <links> <degree> <lending>
2006 128 ±9 355 ± 48 5.5 ± 0.5 20,953 ± 4,240
2011 70 ±8 161 ± 29 4.5 ± 0.5 4,261 ± 1,001
Tab. 1: Network properties
The table shows the properties of the 257 daily networks for 2006 and 2011. We report the average number of links, the
average degree, and the average lending volume together with their standard deviation. The lending volume is measured
in millions in euro.
placed with an identifier, which allows us to in-
fer the nationality of the bank, but not its name.
For each transaction we observe the time, the
traded amount, the interest rate, the identifier of
the counterparts, and who was the initiator of a
transaction. For our analysis we aggregate and
net the loan contracts between all pairs of banks
(nodes) and derive a directed weighted network
for each day (see also Table 1). The weights of
the links are given by the net amount of borrow-
ing between the banks. The trading volume in
the interbank market has changed considerably
as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. Hence,
for our investigation we choose two years in
which the general characteristics of the network
are comparably stable, the first one before and
the second one after the outbreak of the crisis,
2006 and 2011.
In our assessment of the fragility of this net-
work, we repeatedly choose one bank as the ini-
tial defaulter. We assume that this bank will
not repay any of its interbank loans. Whether
banks that lent to a defaulted counterpart de-
fault themselves, depends on the amount of
capital (equity) of a bank, thus, the ability to
write off lost interbank lending. We assume that
no other balance sheet operations can be made
to prevent a default.
Hence, while the amount of interbank loans
are known exactly, we have to approximate the
remaining items on the banks’ balance sheets.
The balance sheet contains external assets A, in-
terbank lending L, capital C, deposits D, and in-
terbank borrowing B (see Table 2). We approxi-
mate the total assets for each bank by assuming
that it is proportional to the average of the trad-
Assets Liabilities
Assets A Capital C
Deposits D
Lending L Borrowing B
Tab. 2: Stylized bank balance sheet
The interbank market activity of the bank shows as lending
L and borrowing B in the balance sheet. In our simulation
the remaining assets A are exogenous. The amount of capi-
tal is always in a fixed proportion to total assets. Customer
deposits D conclude the liabilities side of the balance sheet.
ing volume TV = L + B of the last 10 days in
which the bank was active in the market.1
< TV >t=
∑9i=0(Lt−i + Bt−i)
10
(1)
We assume that the value of all balance sheet
items are constant fractions of the total assets
TA. The parameter values θ and γ that we
choose for the baseline scenario are the same
like in Nier et al. (2007). They are in line with the
empirical findings of Upper and Worms (2002)
and the figures reported in the stress-test of the
EBA (2011). In the baseline scenario, the ratio of
interbank lending L to total assets TA is set to
θ = 0.2 for each bank. Hence, the total assets
1 We choose this specification to ensure that bank’s cap-
ital is always consistent with interbank market exposures
and does not fluctuate wildly. We obtained qualitatively
similar simulation results by estimating TA only from the
current day’s activity, and for estimating TA only from in-
terbank lending. However, the results were more noisy, and,
in the latter case, lead to an indeterminacy for banks that are
only borrowing.
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TA can be written as
TA =
< TV >
2θ
. (2)
This already determines the asset side of the
balance sheet, since the external assets are then
given by A = TA− L. The balance sheet iden-
tity implies that for each bank
TA = A + L = C + D + B. (3)
The ratio of capital to total assets is set to γ =
0.05, hence C = γTA. Since B is given by the
data, this determines the liabilities side of the
balance sheet:
D = (1− γ)TA− B. (4)
2.2 The model
For each day of our sample, we simulate the de-
fault of each bank that is active as a borrower.
We think it is important to simulate the default
of all banks, since focusing on only larger banks
would bias the results towards the local prop-
erties of large banks. We assume that the initial
default is triggered by an external cause, which
is not in the scope of our paper. As the conse-
quence of this default, the bank will not meet
its payment obligations on the interbank loan
market. Hence, all banks which are net lenders
to this one will suffer losses to the position L.
Assuming that the share of a bank’s exposure
to the defaulting institution is φ, the position L
will be reduced to (1 − φ)L. This loss has to
be compensated by other positions of the banks
balance sheet. Since we consider the short-run
effects directly after a default, losses can only be
absorbed by the capital position C. Summing
up, this means that a bank survives a shock as
long as
(1− φ)L + A− B− D > 0. (5)
To check the solvency condition, we calcu-
late the remaining amount of capital (equity) for
each bank after the shock to the system. The
simulation of defaults in this system takes place
in several rounds. After the initial default of
one bank, only other banks with an exposure
to this bank (net lenders) will be effected. We
have to recalculate the balance sheets of all these
banks, and determine, if they could absorb the
initial shock. Eventually some of them default
themselves. In this case, we have to calculate
the 2nd round effects on all banks that are net
lenders to this institution. From this point on,
also banks that were not connected to the ini-
tially defaulted bank can be effected. The recal-
culation of balance sheets is iteratively repeated
until no further bank is found to default.
On the level of the individual bank we have
to consider the shock that it might receive from
a loan that is not repaid. Assume that bank i
is default, because it has received a shock S→i.
It passes a residual shock to all its lenders ki.
The residual shock is given by the difference be-
tween i‘s shock and its capital, S→i − Ci. Let us
assume that Lji represents the amount that bank
j lent to bank i. Bi represents the amount that i
borrowed from the set of banks ki. In case that
banks i’s residual shock is larger than its total
borrowing, bank j will receive a shock equal to
the loaned amount Lji. Otherwise bank i will
repay a fraction of the loan:
Sij = Lji if S→i − Ci > Bi
Sij =
(S→i − Ci)Lji
∑k Lki
if S→i − Ci < Bi
(6)
Put differently, this means that we assume
some recovery for defaults in the successive
rounds of bank failures. Defaulted banks will
use their capital to repay interbank liabilities as
good as they can, but they will not use any of the
deposits. The exact design of this recovery rate
might be debatable. We think that the assump-
tion of some recovery is more realistic than the
assumption of no recovery at all (which is im-
plicitly assumed in some other studies), because
it has a tendency to inflate domino effects.
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Fig. 1: Distribution of degree and capital
Left: The distributions for in- and out-degree differ slightly. For both years the distribution is wider for the out-degree
(lending) than for the in-degree (borrowing). The distributions have a tail and remind of a power-law with cutoff. Right:
The (estimated) capital (in million euro) of banks is also very unevenly distributed. We show the CDF for the empirical dis-
tribution of capital for 2006 and 2011 together with a fitted Normal distribution. For 2006 we also show a fitted exponential
and generalized Pareto distribution. (For this illustration we plot the capital for all banks and all trading days.)
3 Simulation results
3.1 General results
For the simulation we use daily empirical loan
networks. We simulate cascades by iteratively
choosing each bank as the possible source of a
cascade, and we repeat this process for each day
in the data set. For each single run we calculate
if a cascade occurred, how many banks are af-
fected, and how large the aggregated loss is. We
can then related the magnitude of the cascade
to the idiosyncratic properties of the banks, i.e.,
we can analyze in how far the size of the initial
shock, the capital buffer, or the network struc-
ture influence the outcome.
The simulation with empirical data has some
features that set it apart from simulations with
random graphs. One feature is that the activity
of the banks varies over time. In 2011 for ex-
ample, the average number of banks that are ac-
tive on one day is 70, the minimum is 38 and
the maximum is 89 (2006 average: 128, min:
77, max: 144). The reason are mainly the bank
holidays, which are not synchronized between
countries. The average degree is more stable,
for 2011 its fluctuations mostly stay in the band
between 4 and 5. The degree distribution is
somewhat close to a power law, the number of
nodes is of course too small for a precise clas-
sification. Figure 1 shows that the maximum
of the out-degree (borrowing) is slightly larger
than the in-degree (lending). This is caused by
the fact that some larger banks serve as a kind
of hub for the provision of liquidity, which leads
to a slight asymmetry in the market.
Another feature of the data is that we can
have more than one component. This means
that parts of the network can be separated from
the giant component. This can happen, when
for example one small bank is borrowing from
only one other bank, which itself has no other
connections. This feature arises naturally from
the strong heterogeneity in the size of banks. We
checked that the large majority of banks are in
one large component. In 2006 (2011) the aver-
age number of components was 1.7 (2.3).
3.2 Influence of the size of the
shock on the cascade
Whether the initial default of a bank leads to
significant losses to the entire system depends
3 Simulation results 7
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.1  1  10  100  1000  10000  100000
ca
sc
ad
e 
siz
e
default shock (million euro)
2006
2011
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
 0.45
 0.5
 0.1  1  10  100  1000  10000  100000
le
nd
in
g 
lo
ss
default shock (million euro)
2006
2011
Fig. 2: Influence of shock on cascade size
In these scatter plots of simulation results, the shock size is measured by the amount of failed loans of the bank that initially
defaults. The left panel shows the resulting cascade measured by the share of banks that default as a consequence of this
shock. In the right panel the cascade is measured by the share of interbank loans that fail as a consequence of the initial
default.
heavily on the size of the initial shock. For
2006 we analyze 25,914 hypothetical initial de-
faults, in 13,206 cases (50.1 %) this default trig-
gers the successive default of at least one other
bank. In 2011 the number of transactions and
also banks is much lower, thus we investigate
only 13,614 cases of hypothetical initial default,
8,385 of which lead to at least one knock-on de-
fault of another bank (61.6 %). The first impres-
sion from these numbers is that the interbank
market has become more fragile. One reason is
that banks share risks with fewer counterparts
in 2011 (see also Raddant, 2014). However, it
should be noted that in the simulations the ra-
tio of interbank market activity to capital is kept
constant. Even though the interbank network
might be backed by more capital after the finan-
cial crisis, we can still conclude that the network
is structurally more prone to cascade effects in
2011 than it was in 2006.
Figure 2 shows that the cascade size in our
simulation depends on the size of the shock
from the initial defaulter. In network science
often a threshold is defined after which knock-
on effects are regarded as a cascade, e.g., when
more than 5% of the nodes are affected. If such
a measure is used in 2006 (2011) we have 904
(1782) cases, 3.5% (13.1%), in which a cascade
happens. The pure number of affected nodes
is not necessarily the best measure to quantify
the cascade, because the banks which they rep-
resent can be of very different size. Hence, the
right panel shows the cascade size measured
by the fraction of total lending losses. The dif-
ference is that now cases in which high initial
shocks lead to the default of only few but prob-
ably big counterparts are more accurately dis-
played, the same holds for small initial defaults
that only trigger further small banks. When we
apply the same 5% threshold to this measure,
we find that the difference between the years
appears smaller, since in 2006 4.2% of initial de-
faults result in a cascade compared to 8.5% in
2011.2
3.3 Sensitivity to parameters
While the linkages in the interbank market for
our simulation are derived from empirical data,
2 The difference in the cascade size between 2006 and
2011 is not caused by a sudden change. We simulated the
cascade size for all remaining years, and found that the av-
erage cascade size gradually increases, while the average
degree of the network steadily decreases throughout the
years.
3 Simulation results 8
0.05
0.15
0.25
0.35
0.45
0.65 0.005
0.030
0.055
0.070
0.095
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
gamma (capital)theta (lending)
av
er
ga
ge
 c
as
ca
de
 si
ze
Fig. 3: Influence of gamma and theta
A reduction in the ratio of capital to total assets γ has a non-linear effect on the average cascade size, because at low levels
of capital the chance of domino effects increases. Increasing the ratio of interbank assets to total assets θ leads to an almost
linear increase of the average cascade size.
and can thus be regarded as representative for
the interbank assets, the remainder of the bank’s
characteristics are only approximated. The ab-
solute numbers of certain balance sheet items
are in fact not important for the results that we
obtain. The parameters θ and γ, which describe
the share of interbank assets and the ratio of
capital to total assets, are however very impor-
tant. Figure 3 shows their influence on the aver-
age cascade size. The important difference be-
tween them is that the cascade size increases
only slowly once θ passes some upper bound,
while lowering γ leads to a critical point after
that defaults sky-rock. Although these results
are qualitatively similar to those of Nier et al.
(2007) for the Bernoulli random graph, hetero-
geneity of banks and network structure lead to
more realistic results. Different from Nier et
al. (2007) we observe dependency from θ for
a wider range of values, and a continuous in-
crease in the cascade size for γ (as a result of
the network structure and the larger number of
banks). As discussed in section 2.1, our choice
for the parameter values for the baseline sce-
nario are an approximation based on empirical
findings. However, the qualitative results pre-
sented in the remainder of section 3 do not criti-
cally depend on the exact choice of these values.
3.4 Influence of node connectivity
on the cascade
In the following we analyze the influence of in-
dividual node characteristics on the cascade size
and on the chance of survival of banks after a
shock. We start with an analysis of the initially
defaulting bank.
We have already seen that the cascade size
depends on the size of the initial shock. How-
ever, besides the pure size of the shock the con-
nectivity of a bank and the network structure
play a role (see also Battiston et al., 2012a). The
left panel of Figure 4 shows the average cascade
size dependent on the in- and out degree of the
bank that we choose to default. Interestingly,
we observe only few banks that have large in-
and out-degree. The cascade size increases with
the in-degree (borrowing of the defaulted bank),
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Fig. 4: Degree, shock size, and cascade size caused by the initially defaulted bank
The heat maps show the average cascade when a bank with a specific degree defaults in 2006. The left panel shows that
the cascade size increases with the in-degree (borrowing) of the defaulted bank. The right panel shows the relationship of
in-degree and the shock size, i.e. the amount of loans that are not re-payed by the defaulted bank. We observe that large
shocks do not necessarily lead to the largest cascades; medium sized shocks among well connected banks can affect even
more banks.
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The average cascade size increases with the core number
of the initially defaulted bank. (The vertical bar shows the
standard error.)
as can be expected. More interesting is to dis-
entangle the influence of in-degree and shock
size. The right panel shows that even medium
sized shocks can cause large cascades, if banks
are well connected. It has to be noted that some
of the larger shocks in our data set stem from
large international banks, which connections to
other global players outside the Italian E-mid
platform cannot be accounted for in this sim-
ulation. However, the analysis clearly shows
that for any given shock size greater connectiv-
ity leads to larger cascades, i.e., a larger number
of defaulted banks.
A related measure for centrality is the core
number of a node. A k-core is defined as the
largest subgraph which nodes have at least k
connections (see Goltsev et al., 2006). Hence, if
a node has a high core number, this shows that
it has not only a high degree, but that it is also
connected to nodes with a similar high degree.
Figure 5 shows that in fact the cascade size in-
creases with the core number. Previous studies
on disease spreading models have also shown
this effect of coreness on the disease outbreak
size (see, e.g., Kitsak at al., 2010).
After analyzing which bank is the most “dan-
gerous” when it defaults, we can now turn
to the analysis of the vulnerability of banks
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Fig. 6: Degree, closeness, core number, conditional default probability
Left panel: The conditional probability of a bank to default as part of a chain reaction decreases with the in-degree (bor-
rowing). For the out-degree (lending) we observe a hump-shaped relationship. Middle panel: Banks with an intermediate
closeness are the ones most prone to default in our simulation. Right panel: Also for the core number we observe a
hump-shaped relationship with the probability to default.
to this default. Hence, we look at measures
of node centrality to determine which charac-
teristics (besides the shock size) determine the
probability of a bank to default at any stage of
a cascade process. We start with the degree,
which is reported in the left panel of Figure
6. For both years, 2006 and 2011, the condi-
tional probability to default is decreasing with
the in-degree (borrowing), because banks that
borrow a lot are less vulnerable (and mostly
lend less than they borrow). The results for the
out-degree are more interesting. In general, we
would expect that the default probability de-
creases with degree, since shocks are wider dis-
tributed among banks. However, for 2006 we
observe a hump-shaped curve, the probability
to default increases for a degree of up to 7, be-
fore it slowly decreases for banks with more
links. For 2011, where the network is smaller,
we barely reach the point where the probability
decreases (the results for degree > 15 are noisy
due to the small sample). We can infer that this
sample contains a lot of banks that in terms of
risk sharing are too small. Some of these might
in fact be part of an affiliate group of banks.
The analysis of some centrality measures
helps us to understand these patterns. The node
closeness describes how easily a node can be
reached from any other one in the network (see,
e.g., Freeman, 1979). The middle panel of Fig-
ure 6 shows that nodes (banks) that have low
closeness, and are thus difficult to reach for a
shock, have a low probability to default. The
probability increases for values of up to 0.26 and
then decreases for nodes with a higher close-
ness. Put differently, for the connectivity of
banks there is a threshold after which the like-
lihood to be hit by a shock is out-weight by the
benefits from spreading exposures. We obtain
similar results from an analysis of the default
probability dependent on the core number. The
probability to default is highest for banks with
a core number of 4-5, and decreases for values
higher than this.
Our analysis emphasizes that degree, cen-
trality, and coreness are crucially related to the
banks’ ability to withstand shocks. Models with
random interconnections between banks cannot
reproduce all these findings. Therefore they de-
mand further investigation. This is evenmore
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true for the unclear influence of the heterogene-
ity in the size of banks. In the next section, we
compare the results from the empirical cascade
simulation with the results from null models to
disentangle the effect of network structure and
heterogeneity in the size of banks.
4 Null models
The interbank network has several interesting
structural features that are likely to have a sig-
nificant impact on its stability. Among those are
the heterogeneity in the bank size, the direction-
ality and assortativity of links, and the hetero-
geneity in the link weights. In order to investi-
gate the role of each of these features we need
to derive a benchmark; this means that we have
to derive the average cascade size in a network
where these features are excluded or random-
ized. Such a benchmark network is called a null
model. Null models are an established tool to
separate “natural” network effects from influ-
ences that are caused by the actual degree se-
quence of a network, i.e., behavior that is likely
to be strategic and planned, or the outcome of
the environment. Null models have been stud-
ied in ecological networks (see, e.g., Vázquez
and Aizen, 2003), protein networks (see, e.g.,
Maslov and Sneppen, 2002), commmunication
networks (see, e.g., Karsai et al., 2011), face-to-
face interaction networks (see, e.g., Isella et al.,
2011) and recently in trade networks (see Fagi-
olo et al., 2013).
Hence, we compare the stability of the model
based on the empirical network of the inter-
bank market with the stability of different null
models. In all cases we preserve the number of
nodes, the number of links, and the directional-
ity of the network. Specifically, we generate the
following null models:
In the rewired null model we preserve the
degree of each nodes, and the weight of each
link (loan size). The algorithm randomly se-
lects pairs of links with similar size and rewires
(switches) the counterparts of these links, if
the rewired links do not yet exist. If the
rewired links are already present in the net-
work, the algorithm picks another pair with
similar weights. The banks’ balance sheets are
adjusted to be consistent with the slight changes
in the bank’s interbank market activity. This
null model is similar to one proposed by Maslov
and Sneppen (2002). The model should show in
how far the non-randomness of connectivity in-
fluences the stability of the network, given the
very heterogeneous link weights.
In the random (Erdös-Rényi) null model we
start out with the empirical set of loan contracts
and generate random links between the banks
using the empirical loan contract weights. This
null model destroys the topological structure of
the network, but preserves the daily interbank
volume. The size of the banks, their capital, and
their degree are also randomized. The banks’
balance sheets are again adjusted to be consis-
tent with interbank market activity.
The fixed weight null model preserves the
number of links for all banks, but assigns con-
stant weights to all of them. For each day, the
constant weight is calculated by dividing the to-
tal lending by the number of contracts on that
day. Hence, this null model preserves the de-
gree distribution, but makes the link weights
homogenous. Accordingly, the size of banks
(and their capital) is proportional to the degree.
Finally, we assume a random network with fixed
weights. In this null model the link weights are
constant, as described in the previous model.
Moreover, we randomize the connectivity of the
nodes like in the random model. This model has
the least similarity with the empirical network;
it also has the largest deviation in the resulting
average cascade size.
Figure 7 illustrates the size of the cascade in
different null models compared to the results
from the empirical network model of 2011 with
its baseline parametrization.3 For the rewired
model the average cascade size is comparable
to that from the empirical network. The ran-
dom null model, which destroys the degree con-
3 The results are very similar for the empirical network
from 2006.
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Fig. 7: Cascade size for different null models
The box-plots show the average daily cascade size for the empirical model (left) compared to the null models described
in this section for 2011. The rewired and random null model lead to a slightly higher cascade size. The null models that
randomize both, size distribution and links, lead to much larger cascades than the empirical model.
nectivity but keeps the weights, results in a 1.4
times higher cascade size. The fixed weight
model leads to an even 1.9 times higher aver-
age cascade. The random fixed weighted model
results in 2.5 times more defaults than the em-
pirical model. The analysis of the null models
reveals that simulating bank networks assum-
ing homogeneity in the bank and loan size dra-
matically overestimates its fragility. In compar-
ison, the “error” from ignoring the size distri-
butions of loans and banks seems to be much
greater than assuming a wrong distribution of
links and degree.
In section 3.3 we have shown that the cascade
size depends on the lending activity and on the
average amount of capital, i.e. the choice of the
parameters γ and θ. Similarly we can analyze
the sensitivity of the relative differences in the
cascade size for the different null models. To re-
duce the dimensionality of the analysis we will
only look at a variation of the ratio of capital to
total assets γ. This is without loss of generality,
since the system could also be described by one
single parameter, the ratio of lending to capital
(the system has one free parameter).
The left panel of figure 8 shows the average
cascade size for all five models depended on γ
(or, more generally speaking, for different lev-
els of fragility). The deviation of the null mod-
els from the empirical model differ most when
γ is decreased to values much lower than in
the baseline parametrization. While the fixed
weight null model seems to result in a con-
stant overestimation of the cascade size, the two
models with a randomized network structure
show exponentially increasing deviations in the
cascade size for low values of γ. For the fixed
weight model we observe a greater likelihood
of chains of defaults of small banks than in the
empirical model. In this case the fixed weights
lead to the creation of many similar sized small
banks, which all cannot withstand defaults of
slightly larger banks. The increasing deviation
of the models with the randomized network
structure stems from the micro-structure of the
overnight loan market. In the short run most of
the banks are predominantly active on one side
of the market, i.e., excess liquidity or demand
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Fig. 8: Deviations for the null models for different levels of gamma
Left: Null models with randomized network structure show a exaggerated increase in cascade size for systems with low
capital compared with the empirical model. Right: When the cascade size is measured by the lending loss the default of
smaller banks appears less severe in the fixed weight and random fixed weight model, the defaults in the random model
show relatively stronger than in the empirical model. The shaded areas show standard errors.
leads to the fact that they focus on either bor-
rowing or lending. Since a bank can only pass
shock to other banks if it is active on both sides
of the market, the effect of randomization of the
network structure is especially large when the
system is rather unstable (low γ) and chains of
defaults gain importance versus direct effects
of an initial default. The rewired model shows
cascade sizes that are almost indistinguishable
from the empirical model, which leads to the
conclusion that the in- and out-degree distribu-
tions together with bank size is a sufficient de-
scription of the system.
Alternatively we can again look at the lend-
ing loss as a measure of the severity of the cas-
cade. The results for the different models are
presented in the right panel of figure 8. Al-
though the absolute numbers are smaller here,
the qualitative results are similar. In compari-
son with the left panel, the models which use
fixed link weights generate less lending loss for
relatively high values of γ than the empirical
model. This is caused by the default of banks
that appear smaller than in the empirical model.
This effect of the fixed link weights vanishes
once γ becomes relatively small. In these cases
the homogeneity in the size distribution leads to
more chains of defaults.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the likelihood of cas-
cades in an empirical interbank loan market.
The novel aspect of the paper is that we assume
heterogeneity in the size of banks and loans,
which are derived directly and indirectly from
empirical data. Our results indicate that the cas-
cade size depends not only on the size of the
initial shock, but also on the in-degree of the
defaulter. Moreover, the position of the initial
defaulter within the network, e.g. its central-
ity and coreness, plays an important role for its
ability to start a cascade.
We found that the fragility of this market,
given our model, has increased significantly
from 2006 until 2011. Our analysis of the vulner-
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ability of banks shows that for 2006, in line with
theoretical results on risk sharing, the proba-
bility to default decreases with the out-degree.
For 2011 however, we do not observe the same
pattern, instead there is strong positive correla-
tion between the centrality and vulnerability of
banks. It seems likely that the increase in vul-
nerability is linked to a change in lending be-
havior, caused by the lost trust in many borrow-
ers, and that this change feeds back as a nega-
tive influence on overall system stability.
To analyze specific aspects of the network
structure on the cascade process, we made use
of different null models. The results show that
the empirical network has features, which can-
not be captured by randomized network mod-
els. Furthermore, we show that assuming ho-
mogeneity for bank size and link weights can
lead to an overestimation of the fragility of the
system.
We believe that this study is an attempt to
model more realistic financial networks. Fur-
ther research should focus on the influence of
temporal aspects of the interbank network on
cascades of defaults. Another research direction
is to model multiplex networks that incorporate
different financial products and markets.
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